The reputation of Australia’s special forces is beyond repair — is it time for them to be disbanded?
<p>Four years into a constant stream of misconduct allegations, it’s hard to know how to process the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/blood-lust-killings-cover-ups-report-describes-australia-s-abu-ghraib-moment-20201027-p5692v.html">latest revelations</a> about the actions of Australia’s special forces in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>In village after village — in places like Darwan, Sara Aw, Zangitan, Patan, Sola, Shina, Deh Jawz-e Hasanzai and Jalbay — we have seen plenty of evidence to <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/special-forces-chief-acknowledges-war-crimes-blames-poor-moral-leadership-20200628-p556z6.html">support allegations</a> that some Australian special operators committed war crimes in Afghanistan. These stories are now a well-entrenched part of the Australian news cycle.</p>
<p>Oddly though, and despite <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-10/elite-australian-soldiers-accused-of-covering-up-killing-of-boy/8466612?nw=0">photographic evidence</a>, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-22/video-shows-sas-soldiers-discussing-apparent-execution/12789520">video evidence</a>, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-22/video-shows-sas-soldiers-discussing-apparent-execution/12789520">document-based evidence</a> and witness statements from <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/i-ve-been-with-him-in-those-dark-moments-20200806-p55j8z.html">Australians</a>, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-10/death-in-darwan/9813304?nw=0#:%7E:text=Australia's%20elite%20special%20forces%20descended,three%20Afghan%20villagers%20were%20dead.&text=The%20dim%20light%20of%20a,were%20already%20beginning%20their%20work.">Afghans</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RKuAhPX7vd8">Americans</a>, there are still doubters out there.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/pm/soldiers-alleged-actions-dont-exist-in-a-vacuum/12799688">defence commentators</a> seem to cling to the strange fiction that if an allegation has not been rubber-stamped by the inspector-general of the Australian Defence Force (IGADF) or proven in a court, we cannot decide for ourselves whether or not it is true.</p>
<p>As important as <a href="https://theconversation.com/government-bracing-for-damning-report-on-alleged-special-forces-incidents-in-afghanistan-144284">Justice Paul Brereton’s long-awaited report</a> into alleged war crimes is though, we do not need his nod of approval to know there is a problem in Australia’s special forces. Something has to change.</p>
<p><strong>Minor changes are not enough</strong></p>
<p>Certainly, there are indications minor changes are already being implemented. According to the army, these changes include the introduction of <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/special-forces-get-training-in-ethics/news-story/9fab8ce10eb0869564b833862459a6d7">a new ethics training package</a> and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-16/shake-up-elite-special-forces-considered-war-crimes-inquiry/12666398">a new special forces selection course</a>.</p>
<p>But this is not enough. Rather than a solution, the special forces selection ritual is actually part of the problem — designed as it is to elevate and separate an anointed few from the rest of the military.</p>
<p>This process, which concludes with the receipt of a specially coloured beret, has many of the classic features of a cult initiation — a central part of the “<a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp2021/Quick_Guides/BreretonInquiry">code of silence</a>” that prevented whistleblowers from coming forward for so long.</p>
<p>Then there is the fact that key figures behind the new ethics training were early critics of the media’s reporting on alleged misdeeds in Afghanistan — with the coverage described as “<a href="https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/australia%E2%80%99s-special-forces-deserve-respect-not-cheap-shots">cheap shots</a>” against Australian soldiers. This denialist viewpoint has remained strong within the command until only recently and seems to persist among some sectors of the public.</p>
<p>Indeed, the most prominent factor that led to these incidents in Afghanistan is the decoupling of special forces from the command relationships and discipline structures of the conventional army.</p>
<p>Currently, Special Operations Command (the umbrella organisation that manages Australia’s special forces) recruits and trains completely separately from the rest of the Army — deploying small groups for a variety of sensitive tasks abroad. But this step away from the rest of the Army (and its long-tested disciplinary norms) appears to have led to all sorts of improprieties in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Also problematic is the fact those who are implementing the new changes (the chief of the defence force and chief of army) are both ex-special forces officers. This is not to suggest generals Angus Campbell and Rick Burr are compromised in some way — only to point out that extant unit loyalties are formative in any soldier’s thinking.</p>
<p>There are also signs that Burr, in particular, does not understand the cause of the problem.</p>
<p>For example, despite <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/blood-lust-killings-cover-ups-report-describes-australia-s-abu-ghraib-moment-20201027-p5692v.html">strong evidence</a> that the practice of giving excessive authority to junior leaders created an unaccountable “brotherhood” and a general culture of impunity, Burr <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australian-army-rebuilding-special-forces-culture-ahead-of-afghanistan-war-crimes-report/">continues to describe</a> this “command and control philosophy” as an “imperative” for the special forces.</p>
<p><strong>Disbanding the special forces</strong></p>
<p>Naturally, the fate of Australia’s special forces should ultimately be a captain’s call from Australia’s civilian leadership — perhaps the prime minister himself. And here, there is a compelling argument to be made that the command be disbanded.</p>
<p>To some, this might appear a radical suggestion — a sweeping change without precedent. But military units have been moved, shuffled, re-branded, disbanded and reactivated frequently throughout Australia’s history. Surely, a pattern of war crimes allegations is as good a reason as any to make some major institutional changes.</p>
<p>The Australian Defence Force will, of course, still require a special operations capability for complex operations abroad. Special forces do provide an advanced infantry skill set that is sometimes useful for policymakers — be it for a counter-terrorism raid or light-footprint reconnaissance tasks.</p>
<p>But these needs can be met without continuing to feed <a href="https://thenewdaily.com.au/news/national/2019/08/12/3-billion-kit-boost-to-special-forces/">billions of dollars</a> to an elite force that is isolated from the rest of the military.</p>
<p>Instead, the Australian Defence Force could create special operations-capable companies in the conventional infantry battalions. This would mean teams of highly-qualified soldiers who are rapidly deployable, but still governed by traditional “green army” rules and strictures.</p>
<p>Rather than being “selected” and cloistered away from the rest of the force, these soldiers would simply be “trained” — that is, up-skilled and returned to line units, ready for special deployments abroad.</p>
<p>This is comparable to the French <a href="https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Commando_Parachute_Group">Groupement des Commandos Parachutistes</a> (GCP) model, in which special operations capabilities are fully integrated with the rest of the force.</p>
<p>It would also be in keeping with the finest history and traditions of the Australian Army. Elite fighting units like the 2/2 Independent Company have previously been integrated with a regular infantry force (as seen with <a href="https://vwma.org.au/research/home-page-archives/dutch-timor-and-sparrow-force">the Sparrow Force during the Battle of Timor in the second world war</a>).</p>
<p>Whatever our leaders decide — and again, it should be stressed the Cabinet must be front and centre in these changes – Australia’s sullied special forces are not salvageable, at least in their current structure.</p>
<p>Irrespective of what the IGADF and Commonwealth prosecutors are able to prove, the organisation has lost its credibility. It must be disbanded.</p>
<p><em>Written by <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/christopher-elliott-565909">Christopher Elliott</a>, King's College London. Republished with permission of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-reputation-of-australias-special-forces-is-beyond-repair-its-time-for-them-to-be-disbanded-148795">The Conversation.</a> </em></p>
